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in children or the sale of  children, two sometimes overlapping but nonetheless 
distinct offenses. Moreover, anti-trafficking laws have been used to police cross-
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‘reproductive tourism’ and when do they amount to child trafficking? In this paper 
I critically explore intersections between human trafficking laws and CGS, vis-à-
vis the child, charting the relevant trafficking laws in the context of  international 
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occur via surrogacy, CGS in itself  is not child trafficking under international law.
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Introduction
The language and framework of  human trafficking has often been used to 
describe and construct narratives of  commercial gestational surrogacy (CGS1) 
both in the media,2 in academic literature3 and by institutions.4 Narratives of 
CGS as ‘baby-selling’ often conflate or interchange the transfer of  children 
born via surrogacy with trafficking in children or the sale of  children. Yet, both 
trafficking and sale of  children are distinct, albeit sometimes overlapping 
criminal offenses. Conflating or interchanging these terms serves to only further 
confuse an area of  law and policy already wrought with complexity and ambiguity. 
Viewing CGS through the lens of  human trafficking, and in particular child 
trafficking, immediately propels discussions on the use of  assisted reproductive 
technologies (ART) into the realm of  serious organised crime. This is both 
a provocative (re)framing of  the complexities raised by CGS and a powerful 
method of  policing reproductive care services. But is it apposite? In this paper, 
I critically explore intersections between human trafficking laws and CGS, 
1 See the following section on ‘practice and law’ for full definitions.
2 S Jeffreys, ‘Reject Commercial Surrogacy as Another Form of  Human Trafficking’, 
The Conversation, 11 August 2014, retrieved 14 July 2020, https://theconversation.com/
reject-commercial-surrogacy-as-another-form-of-human-trafficking-30314; C White, 
‘Surrogate Parenthood for Money Is a Form of  Human Trafficking’, Forbes, 4 April 
2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/04/04/surrogate-parenthood-
for-money-is-a-form-of-human-trafficking/#723abe421202; C Parker, ‘Scottish 
Catholic Church Compared Surrogacy to Trafficking’, The Times, 19 October 2019, 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/scottish-catholic-church-compared-surrogacy-
to-trafficking-bddflqfzl.
3 A Parker, ‘Reproductive Labor or Trafficking: The effect of  disparate power on consent 
in transnational surrogacy agreements’, J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y, vol. 25, 2015, pp. 155-
172; F M Abdullah ‘Legal and Ethical Aspects Beyond Commercial Surrogacy: Modern 
form of  human trafficking’, Journal of  Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues, vol. 22, issue 
1, 2019, pp. 1-7; J Yacoubian, S George and L Clements, ‘An Examination of 
Compliance With the Inter-Country Adoption Convention: Exploring surrogacy in 
Armenia as a form of  human trafficking’, Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L., vol. 31, no. 3, 2014, 
pp. 811-834; C Schurr and L Perler, ‘“Trafficked” Into a Better Future? Why Mexico 
needs to regulate its surrogacy industry (and not ban it)’, Open Democracy, 17 December 
2015. 
4 European Parliament resolution of  5 April 2011 on priorities and outline of  a new 
EU policy framework to fight violence against women, para 20-21, https://www.
europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-7-2011-0127_EN.html; United Nations 
Human Rights Council, 37th Session, 6 March 2018, Statement by Special Rapporteur 
on the sale and sexual exploitation of  children, M de Boer-Buquicchio, reads: ‘States, 
regardless of  their perspectives on surrogacy, must create safeguards to prevent the 
sale of  or traffic in children in the context of  surrogacy.’ (See further the section on 
‘human trafficking in the context of  surrogacy’ below).
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vis-à-vis the child. Before proceeding further, it is useful to see this intersection 
in practice through recent events in Cambodia. 
In November 2016, Cambodia made international headlines when authorities 
issued a snap ban on all commercial surrogacy, via a directive from the Health 
Minister. At the time Cambodia was a popular destination for couples from around 
the world seeking to build a family through CGS, following the practices being 
shut down in neighbouring India, Thailand, and Nepal.5 The directive had the 
immediate effect of  altering the status of  surrogacy services from legal—by virtue 
of  there being no laws prohibiting the practice—to something that was suddenly 
on dubious legal ground.6 The legal position of  already pregnant surrogates, as 
well as couples and their child(ren) born through surrogacy and still in Cambodia 
awaiting birth and immigration paperwork to be processed, was catapulted into a 
state of  confusion, and would remain so for quite some time. Within two weeks 
of  the directive being issued, an Australian nurse running a surrogacy agency and 
two Cambodian associates were arrested, charged, and jailed for inter alia human 
trafficking offences.7 By 2017, the Cambodian government passed formal laws 
prohibiting commercial surrogacy. Some countries, such as the United States and 
Australia, arranged amnesty for commissioning parents partway through their 
surrogacy journey to collect their children without fear of  arrest.8 Nonetheless, 
the Cambodian position was clear: new cases would be prosecuted. 
Far from shutting down, the Cambodian surrogacy sector simply went 
underground. In July 2018 the Cambodian police arrested, charged, and detained 
32 pregnant surrogates and five intermediaries,9 and in November a further 11 
5 KS Bhangra, ‘India’s Lower House Passes Bill Banning Commercial Surrogacy’, 
BioNews, 14 January 2019, https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_140769; J Photopoulos, 
‘Thailand Outlaws Commercial Surrogacy for Foreigners’, BioNews, 23 February 2015, 
https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_94929; A Ilic, ‘Nepalese Court Suspends 
Commercial Surrogacy’, BioNews, 1 September 2015, https://www.bionews.org.uk/
page_95169. 
6 At the time, the legal status of  the directive was unclear as it was not backed by specific 
laws. 
7 J Willows, ‘Australian Nurse Jailed for Illegal Cambodian Surrogacy’, Bionews, 7 August 
2017, https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_96122.
8 L Cochrane, ‘Cambodia Offers Amnesty So Australians Can Collect Surrogate Babies’, 
ABC, 25 November 2016, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-26/cambodias-
amnesty-for-surrogate-babies/8059714; E Handley, ‘Cambodian Surrogates Face an 
Impossible Choice – Forced motherhood, or years in prison’, ABC, 12 May 2019, 
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-12/cambodian-surrogates-forced-to-be-
mothers-or-face-prison-time/11086640.
9 M Krause, ‘Pregnant Cambodian Surrogates Charged With Human Trafficking’, 
BioNews, 16 July 2018, https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_137194.
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pregnant surrogates and seven intermediaries, for human trafficking offences.10 
The women were carrying babies for mainly Chinese commissioning parents, 
and the intermediaries were of  both Cambodian and Chinese nationality. The 
reasoning of  the Cambodian authorities was elucidated by the deputy director of 
the National Committee for Counter Trafficking: ‘They [intended to] exchange 
their children for money. What we prioritise as the victim is the baby inside the 
mother. To bear a child and then sell it is very inhumane.’11 The surrogates were 
eventually released from detention on the condition that they would keep the 
children until the age of  18 (the alternative being up to 15 years imprisonment), 
despite the fact that as gestational surrogates (defined in the following section) 
they are not genetically related to the children.12 The commissioning parents 
faced no legal consequences.13 
Cambodia is not the only country where human trafficking laws have been used 
to police commercial surrogacy. In Spain, where both commercial and altruistic 
forms of  surrogacy (see the following section for definitions) are illegal, many 
couples travel to Ukraine where commercial surrogacy is legal and regulated. 
However, in September 2018, the Spanish government effectively stranded almost 
30 families in Ukraine, when they ceased registering the births of  babies born 
through surrogacy (a necessary, usually straightforward procedure, in order for 
parents to bring their child(ren) home), citing possible medical malpractice and 
trafficking of  children.14 Neither charge has been substantiated. More recently, 
Ukraine itself  has announced intentions to shut down its commercial surrogacy 
sector: the closure of  country borders and travel restrictions in an effort to 
control the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic left many commissioning parents 
unable to travel to Ukraine for the birth of  their children (one clinic alone 
counted 50 ‘stranded’ babies) and others unable to travel home from Ukraine 
with their newborn(s), thus revealing the extent of  the Ukrainian surrogacy 
market.15 Ukraine’s Ombudsman for Children described the situation as a 
10 M Krause, ‘Cambodia Arrests 11 More Surrogates, as Australian Nurse Released’, 
BioNews, 19 November 2018, https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_139872.
11 M Krause, ‘Pregnant Cambodian Surrogates’. 
12 E Lynam, ‘Cambodia Releases Detained Surrogates’, BioNews, 10 December 2018, 
https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_140307.
13 It is worth noting that this scenario is unusual: anti-trafficking discourses have typically 
focussed on the surrogate as the victim of  exploitation, rather than the child, when 
considering trafficking in the context of  surrogacy (see further the section on ‘human 
trafficking in the context of  surrogacy’).
14 S Pritchard, ‘Spanish Families Stranded in Ukraine in Surrogacy Limbo’, BioNews, 3 
September 2018, https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_138143.
15 O Grytsenko, ‘The Stranded Babies of  Kyiv and the Women Who Give Birth for 




violation of  children’s rights—stopping just short of  labelling it child trafficking— 
and is pushing to close the sector to foreign couples at least.16 These are just 
a few examples of  the confusion between surrogacy and child trafficking; 
the myriad issues these examples highlight will be discussed in the course of 
this paper. 
When do CGS arrangements fall within the category of  legitimate ‘medical 
tourism’ and when do they amount to human trafficking? This question 
has long perplexed lawyers, ethicists, and social scientists.17 For, as the 
examples above demonstrate, the same set of  actions and motivations can 
one day be viewed as cross-border access to ART services, and as possible 
human trafficking the next—a dichotomy that is not to be taken lightly.18 
Exponential growth in the worldwide surrogacy market—the result of  a 
convergence between increasingly accessible ART, globalisation, demand for 
ART due to medical or social infertility,19 and the legal and social recognition 
of  new family structures—means that how we regulate surrogacy across 
borders is a pressing issue. All parties to a CGS arrangement (the commissioning 
parents, surrogate, healthcare professionals, and intermediaries) ought to have 
clarity under the law as to whether they are exercising their rights as private 
citizens, or engaging in a criminal activity. Nor is it in children’s best interests 
for criminal proceedings or legal uncertainties to linger over the conditions of 
their birth. 
The purpose of  this paper is two-fold: first, to chart and place the relevant 
child trafficking laws in the context of  international surrogacy, and second, 
to analyse whether trafficking laws are an appropriate mechanism through 
which to regulate CGS. In doing so I hope to contribute towards an 
understanding of  what distinguishes CGS from child trafficking, and what 
can be done to better delineate this distinction in law and policy. This 
paper proceeds in four parts. In the following section I explain the phenomenon 
of  CGS. I set out the terms and definitions used herein and briefly summarise 
the legal landscape and ethical debates surrounding international CGS. I then 
16 Ibid.
17 C Shalev et al., ‘Ethics and Regulation of  Inter-Country Medically Assisted 
Reproduction: A call for action’, Israel Journal of  Health Policy Research, vol. 5, no. 1, 
2016, pp. 1-12, https://doi.org/10.1186/s13584-016-0117-0; JA Gupta, ‘Reproductive 
Labour or Reproductive Traffcking?: Indian women’s reproductive bodies in the 
globalised bioeconomy’, in RR Flood and JG Payne (eds.), Transnationalising Reproduction, 
Routledge, Abington and New York, 2018, pp. 95-116.
18 Surrogacy arrangements might of  course constitute some other illegitimate practice 
that is not human trafficking.
19 W Lo and L Campo-Engelstein, ‘Expanding the Clinical Definition of  Infertility to 
Include Socially Infertile Individuals and Couples’, in L Campo-Engelstein and P 
Burcher (eds.), Reproductive Ethics II, Springer, Cham, 2018, pp. 71-83. 
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set out the relevant international law on child trafficking; I discuss the 
applicability of  these laws to the practice of  CGS, demonstrating the inherent 
incongruence of  classifying wholesale the practice as trafficking. Finally, 
I draw together my conclusions, returning to the question of  what distinguishes 
CGS from child trafficking.
Surrogacy: Practice and law
Surrogacy is an arrangement in which a woman (the ‘surrogate’) agrees 
to be impregnated and carry a child for another couple or individual 
(the ‘commissioning parent(s)’ or ‘intended parent(s)’). Surrogacy can be 
conducted directly between the surrogate and intending parents. Alternatively, 
the surrogacy can be arranged via an agency or surrogacy clinic which can 
match the surrogates to intending parents, liaise between them, and coordinate 
the surrogacy process. These ‘agents’ or ‘intermediaries’ charge a fee for their 
service. In some places they are also responsible for recruiting women to be 
surrogates.20 
Surrogacy can take two forms: traditional or gestational. In traditional 
surrogacy, the surrogate provides her own egg, which is fertilised with the 
intending father’s or donor sperm, usually via an at-home insemination, 
and rarely via sexual intercourse. In these cases, the surrogate is genetically 
related to the child, as well as being the gestational carrier or birth mother. 
In gestational surrogacy, an embryo, created using either the intended 
parents’ gametes, donor gametes, or a combination of  both, is implanted 
via in vitro fertilisation (IVF) in the surrogate. Here, the surrogate is not 
genetically related to the child; she gestates and births the child who might 
be genetically linked to one or both intended parents. Gestational surrogacy 
is increasingly preferred as it gives the commissioning parents the option of 
having a child that is genetically related through the maternal line, or using 
their preferred egg donor/provider. Removing the genetic relationship 
can also help limit bonding between the surrogate and child,21 enabling a smoother 
transfer of  parental rights. Given its prevalence, and in the interests of  space, 
this paper focuses on gestational surrogacy. 
20 A Pande, ‘Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a perfect mother-worker’, 
Journal of  Women in Culture and Society, vol. 35, no. 4, 2010, pp. 969-992, https://doi.
org/10.1086/651043.
21 Although see: A Pande, ‘“It May Be Her Eggs But It’s My Blood”: Surrogates and 




Surrogacy remains an ethically controversial issue. The use of  IVF technology, 
which can necessitate the destruction of  embryos, the potential use of 
donor gametes, and the fact that gestation occurs outside the traditional, 
heteronormative family setting all contribute to the continued disagreement 
over whether the practice should be allowed on moral grounds. Further 
complicating the ethics of  surrogacy is the fact that it can be carried out 
either altruistically or for payment. In the former, the surrogate is not 
paid; expenses necessary to establishing and carrying through the pregnancy 
are compensated, but she does not profit from the surrogacy. Under 
this model surrogacy is characterised as a benevolent act. On the other hand, 
in ‘commercial’, ‘for-profit’, or ‘compensated’ surrogacy the surrogate does receive 
a fee in addition to her expenses. 
Whilst altruism and commercial surrogacy are certainly not mutually exclusive,22 
the profit-making element highlights the issue of  the potential exploitation 
of  women in vulnerable positions, although it has been argued that curtailing 
or dismissing the ability of  women to make their own choices is paternalistic 
and elitist,23 that it need not be exploitative,24 and that in fact all professionals 
accept money for the use of  their body.25 Moreover, it has been argued 
that surrogacy, indeed all ART, exploits women through controlling their 
reproductive power.26 The arguable commodification of  women for their 
wombs has been characterised as degrading,27 rendering women a ‘breeder class’,28 
 
22 LB Andrews, ‘Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A legal framework for surrogate 
motherhood’, Virginia Law Review, 1995, pp. 2343-2375.
23 R Arneson, ‘Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy’, Phil. & Pub. Aff., vol. 21, 
no. 2, 1992, pp. 132-164.
24 S Wilkinson, ‘The Exploitation Argument Against Commercial Surrogacy’, Bioethics, 
vol. 17, no. 2, 2003, pp. 169-187, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8519.00331; V 
Panitch, ‘Global Surrogacy: Exploitation to empowerment’, Journal of  Global Ethics, 
vol. 9, no. 3, 2013, pp. 329-343, https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2013.818390.
25 MC Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999.
26 G Corea, The Mother Machine: Reproductive technologies from artificial insemination to artificial 
wombs, Harper and Row, New York, 1985.
27 R Macklin, ‘Is There Anything Wrong With Surrogate Motherhood? An ethical 
analysis’, Law, Medicine and Health Care, vol. 16, no. 1-2, 1988, pp. 57-64, https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1748-720X.1988.tb01051.x.
28 JG Raymond, Women as Wombs: Reproductive technologies and the battle over women’s freedom, 
Spinifex Press, Melbourne, 1995.
130
ANTI-TRAFFICKING REVIEW 16 (2021): 123-143
and in doing so reducing children to something that can be ‘bought’29—
thus straddling the fine line between reproductive care and potential child 
trafficking, which is the focus of  this paper. (The trafficking of  women 
for exploitation as surrogates is an equally pressing issue, but it is not the 
focus here.) CGS has been compared ostitution,30 others have conceptualised 
surrogacy as work/labour.31 These are deeply sensitive and complex ethical 
issues upon which there is no global consensus—a fact reflected in the 
considerable variation in the law and policy on surrogacy around the world. 
It is not the purpose of  this paper to assess the ethics of  surrogacy per se, 
however, it is helpful to bear in mind the ethical discourses underpinning law 
and policy. 
The ethical complexities of  cross-border CGS are augmented by narratives 
of  race and class that underlie this phenomenon. Typically, this involves 
wealthy individuals from developed countries, travelling to developing 
world countries in order to seek the services of  a poor woman, leading to 
the ‘stratification of  reproduction’.32 In 1988, sociologist Barbara Rothman 
queried, ‘Can we look forward to baby farms, with white embryos grown 
in young and Third world women?’33—a question that surely resonated 
uncomfortably at the height of  Asia’s surrogacy sector through the 2000s and 
2010s. Nearly two decades later, Amrita Pande reveals the complex and paradoxical 
nature of  global surrogacy at the ‘intersections of  reproduction, labour 
and globalization’ that ‘cross boundaries based on class, caste and religion and 
29 ES Anderson, ‘Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?’, Phil. & Pub. Aff., vol. 19, issue 1, 
1990, pp. 71-92; A van Niekerk and L van Zyl, ‘Commercial Surrogacy and the 
Commodification of  Children: An ethical perspective’, Med. & L, vol. 14, 1995, pp. 
163-170; D Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The moral limits of  markets, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.
30 A Dworkin, Right-Wing Women, Perigee Books, New York, 1978.
31 L Van Zyl and R Walker, ‘Beyond Altruistic and Commercial Contract Motherhood: 
The professional model’, Bioethics, vol. 27, no. 7, 2013, pp. 373-381, https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1467-8519.2012.01962.x; A Pande, Wombs in Labor: Transnational commercial 
surrogacy in India, Columbia University Press, New York, 2014.
32 D Deomampo, Transnational Reproduction: Race, kinship, and commercial surrogacy in India. 
Vol. 1., NYU Press, New York, 2016; FW Twine, Outsourcing the Womb: Race, class and 
gestational surrogacy in a global market, Routledge, New York, 2015; A Pande, ‘This Birth 
and That: Surrogacy and stratified motherhood in India’, Philosophia, vol. 4, no. 1, 2014, 
pp. 50-64.
33 BK Rothman, ‘Reproductive Technology and the Commodification of  Life’, in EH 
Baruch et al. (eds.), Embryos, Ethics, and Women’s Rights: Exploring the new reproductive 
technologies, Haworth, New York, 1988, pp. 95–100; S Markens, ‘The Global 
Reproductive Health Market: US media framings and public discourses about 




sometimes even race and nation’ but ‘ultimately reify structures of  inequality.’34 
These analyses remain relevant despite the surrogacy industry moving from Asia 
towards Eastern Europe: disparities of  class and nationality persist between surrogates 
and intending parents. Furthermore, Seema Mohapatra points out the hypocrisy of 
countries that ban surrogacy on moral grounds, whilst ignoring the phenomenon 
of  their own citizens engaging in reproductive tourism by seeking surrogacy 
services abroad.35 
There are currently no international laws governing international surrogacy 
arrangements. Surrogacy is regulated solely through domestic law: some 
countries have banned the practice outright (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Switzerland, China), some allow altruistic surrogacy, but not commercial 
surrogacy (UK, most states in Australia and Canada, Hong Kong, South 
Africa, Mexico), some allow commercial surrogacy (Ukraine, Georgia, 
some states in the USA), some allow commercial surrogacy under strict 
conditions for their own citizens (Israel, India), and others still have no 
regulation (certain states in Australia and USA). This variation in law and 
policy has encouraged people in countries with restrictive legal frameworks 
or expensive rates to seek surrogacy services abroad, in jurisdictions 
with a permissive or indeed no framework, and lower costs—a phenomenon 
known as ‘medical’ or, more specifically, ‘reproductive tourism’. Asia was 
once a popular destination for commercial surrogacy, with markets 
flourishing in Cambodia, Nepal, Thailand, India, and Laos. As these markets 
have shut down over the last decade (all except Laos), Eastern European 
nations such as Ukraine and Georgia, as well as Greece, have picked up 
much of  the ‘lost trade’. These destinations are particularly popular as they 
offer CGS services at a considerably lower cost than the US, which is 
the only developed country where commercial surrogacy is legal and 
regulated. Given the prevalence of  medical or reproductive tourism for 
surrogacy services—a trend that is still growing36—I focus here on cross-border 
CGS. 
Despite there being no specific international laws targeting cross-border CGS, 
the existing network of  international and European laws do play a role in 
34 A Pande, ‘Global Reproductive Inequalities, Neo-Eugenics and Commercial Surrogacy 
in India’, Current Sociology, vol. 64, no. 2, 2016, pp. 244-258, https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/0011392115614786.
35 S Mohapatra, ‘Adopting an International Convention on Surrogacy—A lesson from 
intercountry adoption’, Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev., vol. 13, issue 1, 2016, pp. 25-55.
36 M Salama et al., ‘Cross Border Reproductive Care (CBRC): A growing global 
phenomenon with multidimensional implications (a systematic and critical 
review)’, Journal of  Assisted Reproduction and Genetics, vol. 35, no. 7, 2018, pp. 1277-1288, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10815-018-1181-x. 
132
ANTI-TRAFFICKING REVIEW 16 (2021): 123-143
regulating the practice.37 A number of  human rights law instruments include 
provisions that are relevant to cross-border CGS, primarily, the UN Convention 
on the Rights of  the Child (hereafter ‘CRC’)38 and the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of  the Child on the sale of  Children, Child Prostitution 
and Child Pornography (hereafter the ‘Optional Protocol’).39 Within Europe, it 
also includes the European Convention on Human Rights, and the jurisprudence 
of  the European Court of  Human Rights.40 The Hague Conference on Private 
International Law (HCCH) began the Parentage/Surrogacy Project in 2011, 
and this is one of  the few examples of  international cooperation on the law and 
policy relating to surrogacy. In 2014, the HCCH published its ‘Study of  Legal 
Parentage and the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements’41 
and it is currently developing a private international law instrument and separate 
protocol on the recognition of  foreign judicial decisions on legal parentage in 
international surrogacy arrangements. Significantly, for the purposes of  this 
paper, any document produced by the HCCH would not encompass trafficking 
in surrogacy, as its mandate only extends to private law matters. The potential 
37 R Blauwhoff  and L Frohn, ‘International Commercial Surrogacy Arrangements: The 
interests of  the child as a concern of  both human rights and private international 
law’, in C Paulussen et al., Fundamental Rights in International and European Law, TMC 
Asser Press, The Hague, 2016, pp. 211-241; B Stark, ‘Transnational Surrogacy and 
International Human Rights Law’, ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L., vol. 18, no. 2, 2011, pp. 
369-386; Y Ergas, ‘Babies Without Borders: Human rights, human dignity, and the 
regulation of  international commercial surrogacy’, Emory Int’l L. Rev., vol. 27, issue 1, 
2013, pp. 117-188; NF Bromfield and K Smith Rotabi, ‘Global Surrogacy, Exploitation, 
Human Rights and International Private Law: A pragmatic stance and policy 
recommendations’, Global Social Welfare, vol. 1, 2014, pp. 123-135, https://doi.
org/10.1007/s40609-014-0019-4; S Allen, ‘Governing Transnational Surrogacy 
Practices: What role can national and international regulation play?’, in M Davies (ed.), 
Babies for Sale: Transnational surrogacy and the new politics of  reproduction, Zed Books, London, 
2017; K Trimmings and P Beaumont (eds.), International Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal 
regulation at the international level, Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 2013. 
38 UN Commission on Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of  the Child, E/CN.4/
RES/1990/74, 7 March 1990.
39 UN General Assembly, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of  the Child on the 
Sale of  Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, A/RES/54/263, 16 March 2001. 
40 C Fenton-Glynn, ‘International Surrogacy Before the European Court of  Human 
Rights’, Journal of  Private International Law, vol. 13, issue 3, 2017, pp. 546-567, https://
doi.org/10.1080/17441048.2017.1385901; K Trimmings and P Beaumont, ‘Surrogacy 
Before the European Court of  Human Rights’, in C Fenton-Glynn, JM Scherpe and 
T Kaan (eds), Eastern and Western Perspectives on Surrogacy, Intersentia, 2019, p. 329 
41 H Baker, ‘Study of  Legal Parentage and the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy 
Arrangements’ (Prel. Doc/ No 3 B), Hague Conference on Private International Law 




for human trafficking in surrogacy is mentioned in a number of  the HCCH’s 
reports (in the context of  women being trafficked for exploitation as surrogates), 
but the distinction between a legitimate arrangement under private law and the 
potential breach of  anti-trafficking laws is not explored at length.42 Finally, the 
child protection and family unification NGO, International Social Service (ISS), 
is currently drafting a set of  internationally agreed principles on the protection 
of  the rights of  the child in the context of  surrogacy that can be used to guide 
policy and legislation.43 Thus, we see that the absence of  a comprehensive legal 
framework on cross-border CGS allows scope for countries to look to alternate 
legal tools, such as anti-trafficking laws, in order to police surrogacy. 
Briefly, it is important to note that beyond domestic laws allowing or disallowing 
CGS as seen above, domestic family and citizenship law frameworks will determine 
critical issues of  filiation and nationality. As nationality can be derived through 
one’s parents, as well as place of  birth, filiation is important, and the two matters 
are often related. Conflicts of  national law on the attribution of  these matters (e.g. 
legal parenthood is commonly attributed to the woman who gives birth and her 
partner; conversely, some countries—notably, Ukraine—attribute parenthood to 
the intended parents from birth) has led to instances where children have been 
rendered ‘parentless’ or ‘stateless’ or both, in contravention of  Articles 7 and 8 of 
the CRC.44 Furthermore, this exposes both the intended parents and surrogates, 
for either party might be in a position where they are caring for a child to whom 
they are legally unrelated, to investigation for child trafficking.45 Thus, aligning 
the law on filiation and citizenship for cross-border CGS is important in the 
context of  trafficking. In Israel, for instance, a genetic link between the child 
42 Ibid.; H Baker, ‘Preliminary Report on International Surrogacy Arrangements’, (Prel. 
Doc. No 10), Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH), March 2012.
43 ISS website, retrieved 14 July 2020, https://www.iss-ssi.org/index.php/en/what-we-
do-en/surrogacy; C Baglietto, N Cantwell and M Dambach (eds.), Responding to Illegal 
Adoptions: A professional handbook, International Social Service, Geneva, 2016, chapter 
6.
44 S Mohapatra, ‘Stateless Babies & Adoption Scams: A bioethical analysis of  international 
commercial surrogacy’, Berkeley J. Int’l L., vol. 30, issue 1, 2012, pp. 412-450, https://
doi.org/10.15779/z380q00; CP Kindregan and D White, ‘International Fertility 
Tourism: The potential for stateless children in cross-border commercial surrogacy 
arrangements’, Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev., vol. 36, issue 3, 2013, pp. 527-628; M Yehezkel, 
‘From Baby M to Baby M (anji): Regulating international surrogacy agreements’, JL 
& Pol’y, vol. 24, issue 1, 2015, pp. 41-93; A Margarlia, ‘Parenthood and Cross-Border 
Surrogacy: What is “new”? The ECtHR’s First Advisory Opinion’, Medical Law Review, 
vol. 28, no. 2, 2020, pp. 412–425, https://doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/fwz042; M Iliadou, 
‘Surrogacy and the ECtHR: Reflections on Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy’, Medical 
Law Review, vol. 27, issue 1, 2019, pp. 144-154, https://doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/
fwy002; Ergas. 
45 Mohapatra, ‘Stateless Babies’.
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and at least one of  the commissioning parents is required in order to rule out 
possible child trafficking.46 Arguably, even in jurisdictions where this approach 
is not enshrined in law, demonstrating filiation can help mitigate suspicion of 
trafficking.47 
Human Trafficking in the Context of Surrogacy: International 
law and policy
Undoubtedly, human trafficking laws have a place within the network of 
laws governing international CGS to prevent and apprehend instances where 
surrogacy is used as means of  trafficking in persons. Anti-trafficking laws have 
typically targeted ‘modern slavery’ and sexual exploitation.48 As new medical 
technologies have advanced, trafficking laws have expanded to target new 
forms of  trafficking, namely, trafficking people for organs and tissue, including 
human egg-cells.49 CGS itself  is not targeted in the international anti-trafficking 
law books, however human trafficking laws can nonetheless be used to police 
reproductive tourism in a number of  ways. It is clear that women can be trafficked 
for the purpose of  serving as surrogates or for the purpose of  harvesting their 
egg-cells.50 That is to say, the legal elements of  the crime of  human trafficking 
can be met vis-à-vis surrogates as victims (see below). I am not suggesting that 
compensated surrogates are by virtue of  their participation in CGS victims of 
human trafficking (which is a discussion worthy of  a separate paper); rather, the 
set of  actions involved in CGS could potentially be both construed as trafficking, 
and evidenced to be so.51 Indeed, the absence of  any meaningful legal distinction 
between the constituent elements of  trafficking and CGS is, in that context, 
46 Shalev et al. 
47 See analyses of  the La Roch case in: Mohapatra, ‘Stateless Babies’, p. 420 and the 
Shigeta case in Mohapatra, ‘Adopting an International Convention’, p. 6.
48 T Truong, ‘Human Trafficking, Globalization, and Transnational Feminist Responses’, 
in R Baksh-Soodeen and W Harcourt (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of  Transnational 
Feminist Movements, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 295. 
49 C Shalev, ‘Limiting Commodification: International law and its challenges’, in J 
Rainhorn and S El Boudamoussi (eds.), New Cannibal Markets: Globalization and 
commodification of  the human body, MSH, Paris, 2015, pp. 363-382.  
50 Ibid.; Truong; J Kostenzer, ‘Human Trafficking and Exploitation for the Purpose of 
Reproduction’, in B Gebrewold, J Kostenzer and A Müller (eds.), Human Trafficking 
and Exploitation: Lessons from Europe, Taylor & Francis, London and New York, 2017, 
ch. 5; K Neorytou, ‘Assisted Reproduction Crime Network in Greece Highlights Need 
for Monitoring Surrogacy’, BioNews, 21 October 2019, retrieved 14 July 2020, https://
www.bionews.org.uk/page_145701.
51 A Parker; Gupta.
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profoundly problematic as it obfuscates the line between legitimate practices 
and criminal behaviour.52 
Might children born via surrogacy and then transferred to the commissioning 
parents also be potential victims of  human trafficking according to the law? The 
example of  Cambodia elaborated on in the introduction demonstrates how a shift 
in policy can transfer the status of  victim from the surrogate to the child, and 
of  trafficker/wrong-doer from the intermediary/commissioner to the surrogate 
herself. I contend that this is not consistent with internationally agreed definitions 
and constructions of  trafficking in persons. Trafficking can occur in the domestic 
or international context; given that the emphasis of  this paper is cross-border 
CGS where the child born will be taken home from the surrogacy host country, 
I focus on the relevant international laws. Applying the law, I show that although 
child trafficking might occur in the context of  CGS, this would be exceptional, 
and that CGS is not in itself  child trafficking. 
The UN Trafficking Protocol is the primary international law instrument 
governing human trafficking.53 Following Article 3(a), in order for something to 
be considered trafficking in persons, three distinct elements must be met: 
i) the act (recruitment, transport, transfer, harbouring, receipt of  persons)
ii) the means (threat or use of  force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, 
abuse of  power or vulnerability, or giving payments or benefits to a 
person in control of  the victim) 
iii) the purpose (for the purpose of  exploitation, which includes, at a 
minimum, exploitation of  the prostitution of  others, sexual exploitation, 
forced labour or services, slavery or similar practices, servitude, and the 
removal of  organs).
Furthermore, Article 3(b) states that any consent derived via the means set out 
in subsection (a) ‘shall be irrelevant’, and that consent is in any event irrelevant 
if  the person trafficked is a child (3(c)). Notably, surrogacy is not specifically 
mentioned in Article 3, nor elsewhere in the Protocol, nor the relevant travaux 
préparatoires. It is mentioned as a potential form of  exploitation in the Model Law 
drafted by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to assist countries in implementing 
the Convention and Protocols54—but no further guidance is offered on how and 
52 Shalev et al.; Shalev. 
53 UN General Assembly, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000.
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when CGS might meet the elements of  trafficking. 
Nonetheless, Article 3(a) is not a closed or exhaustive definition—the purpose 
element only sets out the minimum requirements. Certainly, some writers have 
argued that CGS itself  meets all three elements when the surrogate is considered 
the victim of  trafficking.55 What of  the child as a victim of  trafficking in CGS 
arrangements? Applying the criteria set out in Article 3(a) yields the following: 
i) the act—transferring the child(ren) from the surrogate to the 
commissioning parents, intermediaries may be involved in the transport, 
harbouring, and receipt of  the children
ii) the means—following Article 3(b), this element is not required to be met. 
That said, payments/benefits to the surrogate as the ‘person in control’ 
of  the child, physically and/or legally in her capacity as the automatic 
legal mother (bearing in mind the conflict of  laws viz. parentage alluded 
to above in the section on ‘practice and law’), or to the intermediaries in 
cases where the child(ren) are in intermediary care before being collected 
by the commissioning parents, could nonetheless constitute means. 
iii) the purpose—no exploitative purpose. 
Children brought about via commercial surrogacy overwhelmingly go to 
loving, caring homes.56 These children are joyously welcomed by their intended 
parents and their arrival is celebrated with hope for a happy and fulfilling family 
life—just as any other parent welcomes their newborn. There is no expectation 
of  subsequent exploitation, in the same way that there is no expectation of 
subsequent exploitation when parents whose genetic, gestational and intentional 
parenthood coincide (i.e. the prevailing hetero-normative family ‘ideal’) take their 
children home from a hospital maternity ward. Thus, unless there is evidence 
to the contrary, the purpose for which children born through surrogacy are 
transferred is not an exploitative one, and therefore trafficking is not established. 
The CRC potentially offers a far wider definition of  child trafficking. Article 35 
states that: ‘State Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral 
measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of, or traffic in children for any 
purpose or in any form.’ [my emphasis]
Taken at face value, under this approach exploitation need not be demonstrated 
as the purpose of  trafficking, and nor is the method of  trafficking limited, 
that is to say, it could encompass CGS arrangements. However, although the 
wording of  Article 35 offers more flexibility to establish trafficking practices, 
55 A Parker; Gupta. Although see for counter-arguments: Pande, ‘Wombs in Labour’; 
Panitch; B Parry, ‘Surrogate Labour: Exceptional for whom?’, Economy and Society, vol. 
47, no. 2, 2018, pp. 214-233, https://doi.org/10.1080/03085147.2018.1487180. 
56 See intended parents’ accounts in: Grytsenko.
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the implementation guide cuts back significantly on that flexibility. Readers 
are redirected to Article 3(a) of  the Trafficking Protocol for a definition of 
human trafficking—which is at odds with Article 35. The former includes 
an unequivocal requirement for demonstrating the exploitative purpose; 
the latter does not. Neither the CRC nor the accompanying implementation guide 
mentions surrogacy, although intercountry adoption is specifically addressed. The 
guide does state that Article 35 serves as a safety net ‘to ensure that children are 
safe from being abducted or procured for these [CRC Articles 21, 32, 33, 34, 
36] purposes or for any other purpose.’ (p. 531) It is far from clear that CGS in 
itself  would fall foul of  article 35 on trafficking grounds. CGS may, however, 
be construed as sale of  children, a separate offence under Article 2(a) of  the 
Optional Protocol. 
The Optional Protocol does not specifically mention surrogacy, however, 
the sale of  children under Article 2 was specifically considered by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the sale and sexual exploitation of  children, Maud de Boer-
Buquicchio (hereafter the ‘Special Rapporteur’), in a thematic report presented 
to the UN Human Rights Council.57 In fact, this report is directed at preventing 
the sale and trafficking of  children in the context of  surrogacy, with both ‘sale’ and 
‘trafficking’ repeatedly emphasised together throughout the report (paragraphs 
34, 36, 37). Given this, it is disappointing that the law on trafficking in children 
is not at all explored, or at least distinguished and set aside in the report, nor 
discussed during the interactive dialogue,58 nor the follow-up report.59 Trafficking 
is listed in the report as an abusive practice in surrogacy (paragraphs 29-33), but 
no evidence of  child trafficking as per Article 3 of  the Trafficking Protocol is put 
forward. The example of  the Baby 101 surrogacy ring cited appears to have been 




57 UN Human Rights Council, Report of  Special Rapporteur on the Sale and Sexual Exploitation 
of  Children, Including Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Other Child Sexual Abuse 
Material A/HRC/37/60, 15 January 2018 (‘SR Report 2018’), https://undocs.org/
en/A/HRC/37/60.
58 Ibid.; OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council Discusses the Right to Privacy, and Commercial 
Surrogacy in the Context of  the Sale of  Children’, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22768&LangID=E.
59 UN Human Rights Council, Report of  Special Rapporteur on the Sale and Sexual Exploitation 
of  Children, Including Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and other Child Sexual Abuse 
Material A/74/162, 15 July 2019, https://undocs.org/en/A/74/162.
60 Anon, ‘Thai Police Free 14 Women From Illegal Baby-Breeding Farm in Bangkok’, 
Huffington Post, 24 February 2011, retrieved 14 July 2020, https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/vietnamese-women-freed-fr_n_827595.
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On the other hand, the law on the sale of  children is considered in depth 
(paragraphs 41-51) and the report concludes that commercial, and in some 
cases altruistic, surrogacy usually does meet the elements of  the sale of  children 
under the Optional Protocol—and that most CGS arrangements are therefore in 
contravention of  international law. Briefly, for the sale of  children is not focus of 
this paper, the elements of  sale under Article 2 are: i) remuneration or any other 
consideration (payment), ii) the transfer of  the child, and iii) the exchange, i.e. 
payment for transfer. Article 3 (Optional Protocol) sets out the minimum acts and 
activities for which the sale of  children is prohibited: sexual exploitation, transfer 
of  organs for profit, and forced labour. On this analysis the child is viewed as a 
commodity.61 However, whether the payment in gestational surrogacy is payment 
for the child itself, or the surrogate’s gestational service, and whether intending 
parents can in fact buy a child that is or was always ‘theirs’ (through intention, 
genetics or both)62 or indeed at all (for CGS arrangements do not presuppose 
that parents have ownership rights over children)63 is a matter of  contention. 
This ultimately depends on how surrogacy is conceptualised and organised—as 
work, commerce, or altruism.64
There is considerable scholarly debate over whether Article 35 (CRC) and 
Articles 2 and 3 (Optional Protocol) extend to CGS at all. Some scholars65 
maintain that interpreting these Articles according to the ordinary meaning of 
the terms used clearly results in CGS amounting to the sale of  children—this 
appears to be the approach adopted by the Special Rapporteur.66 However, 
 
 
61 DM Smolin, ‘Surrogacy as the Sale of  Children: Applying lessons learned from 
adoption to the regulation of  the surrogacy industry’s global marketing of  children’, 
Pepp. L. Rev., vol. 43, issue 2, 2015, pp. 265-341, https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.
edu/plr/vol43/iss2/2.
62 JKM Hanna, ‘Revisiting Child- Based Objections to Commercial Surrogacy’, Bioethics, 
vol. 24, no. 7, 2010, pp. 341-347, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2010.01829.x.
63 Arneson.
64 M Cottier, ‘Understanding the Impact of  Different Concepts of  Surrogate Mother 
for the Regulation of  International Surrogacy Arrangements’, Voelkerrechtsblog, 22 July 
2016, https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/understanding-the-impact-of-different-concepts-
of-surrogate-mother-for-the-regulation-of-international-surrogacy-arrangements.
65 J Tobin, ‘To Prohibit or Permit: What is the (human) rights response to the practice 
of  international commercial surrogacy?’, Int’l & Comp. LQ, vol. 63, issue 2, 2014, pp. 
317-352, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589314000049.
66 SR Report 2018, paragraphs 41-51. 
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others67 argue that the treaties must be interpreted in light of  their object and 
purpose—‘to prevent harm to children, to protect children’s rights and to 
promote their best interests’68—and that it is not obvious how CGS contravenes 
these aims, given the intention of  all surrogacy arrangements is to bring much-
wanted children into families that are ready to care for them as their own.69 
Furthermore, although it is not excluded, this intended outcome does not sit 
logically alongside the (minimum) prohibited purposes of  sale listed in Article 3 
(Optional Protocol), all of  which are clearly degrading and exploitative.70 Johnson 
goes further, arguing that following a complete and contextualised reading of 
both treaties, CGS in fact advances rather than contradicts the goals of  the CRC 
set out in the Preamble—to allow children to ‘grow up in a family environment, 
in an atmosphere of  happiness, love and understanding’71—and that there is no 
evidence to date that surrogacy detracts from this objective.72 This argument 
applies equally to any attempt to bring CGS under the broad definition of 
trafficking in Article 35 (CRC). 
CGS has been intuitively linked to trafficking in children. It is not difficult 
to see how: surrogacy as a transaction has been criticised as manifesting the 
commodification of  children (and women), and commodification in turn is 
associated with exploitation—the very thing that anti-trafficking laws seek to 
prevent. However, the fact that commercial surrogacy can—but not necessarily 
does—involve exploitation, does not mean that it is therefore an act of  child 
trafficking. Even if  the process of  surrogacy is deemed to commodify the child, 
it does not follow that such commodification was carried out for the purpose 
of  exploitation under Article 3(c) (Trafficking Protocol). And, as demonstrated 
above, the CGS process itself  does not meet the third element of  trafficking in 
persons. This is not to undermine the very serious issues of  both commodification 
of  children (and women) and the exploitation of  vulnerabilities of  each party: 
the surrogate’s need to alleviate her economic position, the intending parents’ 
inability to form a family without ART, the child’s right to a family (i.e. parents) 
and citizenship, etc. These issues are of  critical importance, but they are outside 
 
 
67 L Johnson, ‘Commercial Surrogacy Is the Sale of  Children? An argument that 
commercial surrogacy does not violate international treaties’, Wash. Int’l L. J., vol. 28, 
no. 3, 2019, pp. 701-726; P Gerber and K O’Byrne, ‘Souls in the House of  Tomorrow: 
The rights of  children born via surrogacy,’ in P Gerber and K O’Byrne (eds.), Surrogacy, 
Law and Human Rights, Routledge, Abington, 2016, pp. 81 -112 
68 Gerber and O’Byrne, p. 97.
69 Ibid.
70 Johnson; Gerber and O’Byrne.
71 CRC Preamble.
72 Johnson, p. 712. 
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the remit of  anti-trafficking law, which refers to a specific set of  actions and 
intentions. In an area that is emotionally sensitive, ethically controversial, 
and inconsistently regulated, accuracy and clarity is crucial when considering 
the applicability of  human trafficking charges. Safeguarding against issues of 
commodification and exploitation in this wider sense requires the development 
of  rigorous, comprehensive, and targeted international laws and legal bodies 
to effectively regulate cross-border surrogacy, and consider more closely the 
interaction between the private, public, and potential criminal law dimensions 
of  assisted reproduction. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that this exact confusion between ‘sale of  children’ 
and ‘trafficking in children’ is an issue that also pervades intercountry adoption.73 
Indeed, intercountry adoption has often been compared to cross-border CGS as a 
field sharing some similar characteristics.74 The HCCH’s Convention on Protection 
of  Children and Co-operation in Respect of  Intercountry Adoption75 is the main 
international law document regulating cross-border adoption, seeking to ensure 
that ‘adoptions take place in the best interests of  the child’ (Article 1a) and ‘to 
prevent the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children’ (Article 1b). It has often 
been held up as model for a future cross-border surrogacy convention.76 As with 
CGS, it is difficult to establish the ‘purpose for exploitation’ element necessary to 
determine trafficking in the context of  intercountry adoption—a fact conceded by 
those who would prefer to police the practice through anti-trafficking law.77 The 
difficulty in establishing trafficking under Article 3(a) has led some to propose 
removing the ‘purpose of  exploitation’ criteria, on the grounds that not all people 
who are trafficked are necessarily subsequently exploited, and vice versa.78 
 
 
73 N Cantwell, ‘Editorial’, ISS Monthly Review, no. 11-12, 2005, p. 1; Mohapatra, ‘Adopting 
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74 Mohapatra, ‘Adopting an International Convention’; Smolin, ‘Intercountry Adoption’; 
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To date there are no proven cases of  surrogacy for the purpose of  subsequent 
exploitation. That is not to say it will not happen: There are two known cases of 
children being born through surrogacy to an intended parent (in both cases the 
father) who was subsequently found to be a convicted child sex offender.79 In 
neither case were trafficking charges raised, and both home country authorities 
have concluded, following investigation, that it is in the best interests of  the 
child to remain with the intended parent despite his convictions, that there is 
no evidence of  harm, and that the risk of  harm is low (monitoring is ongoing). 
In both cases, a background check would have revealed the intended father’s 
criminal record and could have prevented the surrogacy from proceeding on 
grounds of  suspected trafficking—for in both cases surrogacy for the purpose 
of  subsequent exploitation was and remains a real danger. Two points emerge: 
firstly, that child trafficking in the context of  surrogacy, albeit rare, is a real risk 
that must be taken seriously. Manipulating the language of  child trafficking 
to lobby against CGS wholesale obfuscates these risks and frustrates the 
development of  regulatory safeguards to actively prevent trafficking. Child 
trafficking is a devastating and serious criminal matter that must be properly 
understood and discussed with rigour and accuracy, rather than headline-grabbing 
rhetoric.80 Secondly, these cases simultaneously highlight the alarming lack of 
oversight, and the corollary urgent need for international cooperation and robust 
regulation to prevent and detect harms, including human trafficking. A blanket 
ban cannot achieve this.81 As seen in Cambodia, banning commercial surrogacy 
simply drove the practice underground, where there is no oversight to ensure 
legal, ethical, and medical care standards are being met, no dispute resolution 
procedures, and no mechanisms for accountability.
Conclusion
In this paper I have sought to place anti-trafficking laws within the network 
of  laws that impact international surrogacy. In doing so, I have shown that the 
language and lens of  human trafficking has been used and misused to police 
CGS. ‘Trafficking in children’ has been conflated and confused with the ‘sale of 
children’ at the expense of  properly considering the applicability of  international 
79 J Overdorf, ‘Israeli Sex Offender Taps India’s Booming Surrogacy Trade for Baby 
Girl’, The World, 10 June 2013, https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-06-10/israeli-sex-
offender-taps-indias-booming-surrogacy-trade-baby-girl; M Safi, ‘Baby Gammy’s Twin 
Can Stay With Australian Couple Despite Father’s Child Sex Offences’, The Guardian, 
14 April 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/apr/14/baby-
gammys-twin-sister-stays-with-western-australian-couple-court-orders.
80 J Millbank, ‘Gammygate II: Surrogacy law must not be based on the latest tabloid 
story’, BioNews, 27 April 2015, https://www.bionews.org.uk/page_95013.
81 Bromfield and Rotabi, p. 131.
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anti-trafficking laws. Focussing on that, I have demonstrated that CGS itself  does 
not meet the elements of  the crime of  trafficking in children in accordance with 
international law, and nor is it clear that CGS falls within the ambit of  the sale of 
children offence. Yet, states and institutions have inaccurately and misleadingly 
used the weight and/or rhetoric of  child trafficking laws to discourage cross-
border CGS—i.e. reproductive tourism—wholesale. This is problematic for two 
reasons.
Firstly, it is a misuse of  the law on child trafficking; in an area already fraught 
with ambiguity, manoeuvring anti-trafficking laws to achieve outcomes beyond 
those which they are designed to target adds significantly to the legal uncertainty 
faced by already vulnerable parties. When there is no evidence indicating or 
suggesting subsequent exploitation (of  the child, in this case), anti-trafficking laws 
do not apply. The sweeping use of  anti-trafficking laws to target CGS is rather an 
attempt to assert a particular ethical position vis-à-vis CGS—in short, to stop it. 
Sovereign states are of  course free to legislate nationally as they wish; however, 
the reality is there is both a demand for ART, and people and places willing to 
provide these services. Reproductive tourism for CGS needs to be addressed 
with due care and thought, rather than ignored, outsourced, or indirectly banned 
through anti-trafficking laws. And even countries who specifically ban surrogacy 
practices must confront how to handle reproductive tourists returning home.82 
Secondly, the consequences of  employing anti-trafficking laws in the context 
of  CGS must be examined. For the Spanish families trapped in Ukraine, it 
was the child—left legally stateless and parentless for weeks to months—who 
was most affected. Likewise, in Cambodia, children born via CGS have been 
separated from their intended, and perhaps genetic, parents and placed in the 
care of  a surrogate who a) did not intend to expand her family, and b) far from 
alleviating her economic position, will now be under even more financial strain to 
provide for a larger family. In both instances the intended parents are indirectly 
punished (the threat of/actual loss of  their child), and in the latter, surrogates 
were directly targeted. It is difficult to see how these outcomes are defensible or 
desirable for any of  the stakeholders, including the states. And yet, commercial 
surrogacy continues; Spanish families are travelling to Ukraine83 and CGS operates 
underground in Cambodia.84 
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Surrogacy is about building families. To view CGS simply through the framework 
of  trafficking or the sale of  children is to miss the point that distinguishes this 
practice. A surrogate child is planned as a welcome addition to the intended 
parents’ family. Here, the intention is to build a family; in trafficking, the intention 
is to exploit a child. Whilst existing laws on human rights and trafficking could 
provide a scaffold for the regulation of  cross-border CGS, ultimately, the unique 
ethical and practical issues raised by this practice require targeted, detailed laws 
that respond on point to the vulnerabilities of  each party to prevent exploitative 
practices manifesting and to promote safe practices that protect the interests 
of  all parties. Such an undertaking, however, goes far beyond the purpose and 
function of  human trafficking laws. 
Nishat Hyder-Rahman read law at the London School of  Economics, gaining 
an LL.B (Hons) and LL.M (Legal Theory). She pursued doctoral studies at the 
University of  Manchester and was awarded a Ph.D. in Bioethics and Medical 
Jurisprudence for her research into the development of  cross-border governance 
frameworks for emerging biotechnologies. Most recently, Nishat was post-doctoral 
scholar at Utrecht University’s Centre for Research into European Family Law. 
Her research focussed on the intersection of  bioethics, medical law, and family 
law in the context of  reproductive rights. Email: n.hyderrahman@gmail.com
